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earlier realization of his benefits operates as an inducement to the
employee to seek such a recovery,112 an incentive enhanced by the
recent amendment to Section 29(1),1 s it appears incongruous to
reject an apportionment which depletes the employee's share of
the judgment but then allows him to recoup the costs assessed
against him in the form of periodic future payments from the carrier. 31 4 It is submitted, therefore, that where the third party recov-

ery does not exceed the sum of the lien and the carrier's future
obligation, the objectives of the WCL could best be met if future
courts, in equitably apportioning the litigation expenses, strive to
maximize the residuum of the judgment.
Paul R. Williams

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW

Court of Appeals prohibits insurer'sindemnification of municipal
employee for punitive damages arising out of federal civil rights
action as contrary to public policy
Under a policy of liability insurance, an insurer is obligated to
indemnify its insured for an award of compensatory damages rendered in a suit within the purview of the policy's provisions.sle
of the worker and his family through preservation of any rights he may have which are not
inconsistent with the compensation system. See McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture:A Study of the Liabilitiesand Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REV.
389, 401 (1959).
312 In the 1975 Memorandum, note 287 supra, the Law Revision Commission implicitly
recognized that a reduction, or elimination of the proceeds inuring to the employee from the
third party action would detract from the policy of encouraging employees to pursue their
common-law remedies. See id. at 1552.
313

See id. at 1552-53.

314

See generally N.Y, WORK. Comp'.

supra.

LAW

§ 29(4)(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); note 287

310 See 1 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 1:2, 1:4, 1:5 (2d ed. 1959). Insurance
is a voluntary contract between an insurer and its insured. The rights and obligations of the
parties, absent contravention of public policy or statute, are governed by the policy's terms.
Id.; V.PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 542 (4th ed. 1971). See Kronfeld v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 81
Misc. 2d 557, 562, 365 N.Y.S.2d 416, 422 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), af'd, 53 App. Div. 2d
190, 385 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1st Dep't 1976). The duty of an insurer to defend a lawsuit brought
against its insured arises when the pleadings disclose facts which describe a risk covered
under the policy. Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 399, 371 N.Y.S.2d
927, 934 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
Liability insurance is designed to reduce an insured's risk of loss and protect him
against the deleterious effects of large damage awards. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCI-
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Where an insured's conduct is criminal or intentional, however,
considerations of public policy preclude him from avoiding the full
consequences of his behavior by shifting liability through the
purchase of insurance.31 6 Since punitive damages are awarded in
order to punish a wrongdoer for conduct that is reckless or consciously disregards the rights of others, indemnification of an individual following such an award likewise has been barred.1i Re1-5 & 31-37 (6th ed. 1976); W. PROSSER, supra, at 541-44. As a contract
among similarly situated individuals to share losses, "[i]nsurance allows the individual insured to substitute a small, definite cost (the premium) for a large but uncertain loss (not to
exceed the amount of the insurance) under an arrangement whereby the fortunate many
who escape loss will compensate the unfortunate few who suffer loss." R. MEHR & H. CAMMACK, supra, at 31-32. Although early critics of liability insurance contended that it encouraged negligence by allowing the tortfeasor to escape the full consequences of his conduct, W. PROSSER, supra, at 543, as the number of uncompensated injuries increased,
statutes requiring mandatory liability coverage were enacted to assure the party injured
recovery sufficient to compensate him for his loss. E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-321
(McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW §§ 50-52 (McKinney 1976);
see Poniatowski v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 76, 80, 198 N.E.2d 237, 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d
849, 851 (1964); In re MVAIC, 32 Misc. 2d 946, 947, 228 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 18 App. Div. 2d 810, 238 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't
1963).
"' See Morgan v. Greater N.Y. Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 305 N.Y. 243, 248, 112
N.E.2d 273, 275 (1953); Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 165, 133 N.E.
432, 433 (1921); E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLIOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 412-13
(2d ed. 1978). Spreading liability for criminal or intentional conduct among policy-holders
violates public policy by thwarting society's interest in imposing the monetary sanction. See
Kendrigan, Public Policy's ProhibitionAgainst Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages,
36 INS. COUNSEL J. 622, 625 (1969). As a general rule, insurance policies exclude coverage for
acts committed deliberately by or at the direction of the insured, E. VAUGHAN & C. ELLIOTr,
supra, at 413; see McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 41, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 915-16
(4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E,2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963), or confine
coverage to "accidents." Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 68 Misc. 2d 514, 515, 327 N.Y.S.2d
532, 533 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1971), rev'd, 45 App. Div. 2d 350, 355, 358 N.Y.S.2d 519,
524 (2d Dep't 1974), afl'd, 38 N.Y.2d 735, 343 N.E.2d 758, 381 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1975). Where
the insured is liable vicariously, however, coverage for intentional torts has been allowed.
See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 734 (1935); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 So.2d 545, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1st Dist. 1969);
Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Town of Derry, 118 N.H. 469, 471, 387 A.2d 1171,
1173-74 (1978). But see Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 11 FED'N OF INS.
COUNSEL 59, 61 (1960); McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal,27
DE PAUL L. REV. 571, 577-78 (1978).
$17 See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 179 N.E.2d 497, 500, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488,
490 (1961); Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 340, 340, 243 N.Y.S.2d 231,
232 (1st Dep't 1963) (per curiam), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 536, 197 N.E.2d 783, 248 N.Y.S.2d 396
(1964). In contrast to the policy against insurance coverage for punitive damages arising
from an insured's wanton and reckless conduct, an insurer must indemnify its insured for an
award of compensatory damages arising from such conduct. Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co.,
59 Misc. 2d 615, 618, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969);'cf. Padavan v.
PLES OF INSURANCE
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cently, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Village of
Hempstead,318 the Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of public policy, a municipal employee similarly may not be indemnified
under a municipality's liability policy for any obligation to pay punitive damages based on a violation of the Civil Rights Act. 19
In Village of Hempstead, Lawrence Critelli brought an action
in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging
violation of his civil rights by two Village of Hempstead police officers. Thereafter, the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. sued
in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a declaration that under
the Village of Hempstead's liability insurance policy, it was not obligated to indemnify the two village policemen for punitive damages sought in the pending civil rights action.32 ° While interpreting
the "ambiguous wording" of the insurance policy against the insurer to cover punitive as well as compensatory damages,3 21 special
term, nevertheless, granted Hartford's motion for summary judgment, holding that liability coverage for punitive damages violated
public policy. 322 The Appellate Division, Second Department, afClemente, 43 App. Div. 2d 729, 730, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696-97 (2d Dep't 1973) (Compensatory damage award for gross negligence not contested by insurer).
318 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979), aftg 61 App. Div. 2d 893,
402 N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't 1978).
", 48 N.Y.2d at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54.
320 Id. at 220-21, 397 N.E.2d at 739, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 49. In the underlying federal suit,
Critelli alleged that two Village of Hempstead police officers battered him about the head,
face and body with their nightsticks in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The policemen
saw Critelli lying on the grass adjacent to a public street in a "drunken stupor" and claimed
they were trying to rouse him. Since the only relief sought in the federal suit was $100,000
in punitive damages, Hartford disclaimed any obligation under the policy based on the policy's alleged exclusion of coverage for punitive damages. Id. at 221, 397 N.E.2d at 739, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 49. The Village of Hempstead was not named a defendant in the federal action
because suit was instituted while a municipality had not been considered a "person" within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and hence could not be sued under that section. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
32 48 N.Y.2d at 221, 397 N.E.2d at 739, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The policy in Village of
Hempstead obligated the carrier to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury." Id. at 222 n.4, 397 N.E.2d at 740 n.4,
422 N.Y.S.2d at 49-50 n.4. Typically, ambiguous language in an insurance policy is construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Inexplicit exclusions and limitations
in a policy are disfavored. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 81 Misc. 2d 557, 562,
365 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), af'd, 53 App. Div. 2d 190, 385 N.Y.S.2d
552 (1st Dep't 1976).
322 48 N.Y.2d at 221, 397 N.E.2d at 739, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The Court's order to Hartford to defend the policemen in the federal suit because its "obligation to defend is broader
than its duty to [indemnify]" for punitive damages was not appealed by Hartford. Id. The
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firmed without opinion.2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, basing
its decision solely on considerations of public policy. 2 4 Writing for
the Court, Judge Meyer noted that the provisions of the General
Municipal law that require a village to indemnify its police officers
for liability incurred in the course of their employment 25 and authorize a village to indemnify employees for acts performed in
good faith 2 6 do not evince a clear legislative policy concerning
whether coverage for punitive damages is appropriate.2 7 Consequently, the Court focused on the function of punitive damages in
resolving whether insurance coverage was permissible as a matter
of policy.3 28 Finding that the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence underlying an award of punitive damages would be undermined if a tortfeasor were permitted to avoid liability for his "conCourt reasoned that, even though the relief sought was limited to punitive damages, a jury
nevertheless may award compensatory damages requiring the insurer to defend. Id.; see Cordial Greens Country Club, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 996, 997, 363 N.E.2d
1178, 1179, 395 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (1977); Rimar v. Continental Cas. Co., 50 App. Div. 2d
169, 172, 376 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (4th Dep't 1975).
323 61 App. Div. 2d 893, 402 N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't 1978), afl'd, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397
N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979).
324 48 N.Y.2d at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54. The Court decided the
case without considering the terms of the policy between Hartford and the Village of Hempstead. Sections 50-j(1) and 52 of the New York General Municipal Law were enacted in 1975
and 1976, respectively, while the Village of Hempstead's policy commenced, and the injury
occurred, in 1972. Id. n.10. Since modifications in the insurance law may not be enforced
against an insurer until it has had a chance to discontinue coverage, the Court declared that
even it it were to decide the issue of the interpretation of the policy, it would do so without
reference to sections 50-j(1) and 52. Id.
32 GML § 50-j(1) (1977) provides that a village:
shall assume the liability to the extent that it shall save harmless, any duly appointed police officer of such municipality, authority or agency for any negligent
act or tort, provided such police officer, at the time of the negligent act or tort
complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of
his employment.
320 Unlike § 50-j(1), GML § 52 merely is permissive:
Each city, county, fire district, school district, town and village may purchase
liability insurance with such limits as it may deem reasonable for the purpose of
protecting its officers and employees against liability for claims arising from their
acts while exercising or performing or in good faith purporting to exercise or perform their powers and duties.
3127 Assuming, as defendants had contended, that § 50-j(1) was "broad enough" to
permit a municipality to indemnify a police officer for punitive damages, the Court nevertheless
interpreted the "good faith" language of § 52 restrictively to bar insurance for this purpose.
48 N.Y.2d at 225, 397 N.E.2d at 742, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 52; see notes 325 & 326 supra, and
notes 338-340 and accompanying text, infra.
328 48 N.Y.2d at 226-27, 397 N.E.2d at 742-43, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 52-53.
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scious [or reckless] disregard of the rights of others" through the
purchase of insurance, 2 9 the Court concluded that coverage was
barred on policy grounds. 30 In so holding, the Court rejected the
contention that exposing municipal police officers to an uninsured
risk of punitive damages would deter them from vigorously discharging their duties. 3 1 Judge Meyer similarly dismissed the argument that a municipality's liability for large punitive damage
awards would have a devastating impact on its financial base
should it be held directly liable for its own improper conduct or
vicariously liable for its employee's conduct; Judge Meyer observed
that a defendant can influence the size of the punitive damages
award by submitting evidence of its financial resources to the
jury.3 s2 Noting that its holding was in accord with the rule applicable to nongovernmental insureds,3 3 the Court stated that the Leg3,9Id. at 227-28, 397 N.E.2d at 743-44, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54. Judge Meyer rejected the
argument that coverage should be allowed because punitive damages in fact do not deter
intentional or reckless conduct. Id. at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54; see note
317 supra. The further argument that the Court should not protect an insurer who fails to
exclude coverage for punitive damages likewise was rejected. Id. at 227, 397 N.E.2d at 743,
422 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
130Even though the Court restricted its decision to the public policy considerations
pertinent in a Civil Rights Act action, the Court indicated that its holding may be extended
in appropriate cases. Id. at 228 n.16, 397 N.E.2d at 744 n.16, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54 n.16. The
Court also noted that coverage for punitive damages in the future may be found appropriate
where the insured's liability merely is vicarious. Id. at 223, 397 N.E.2d at 740, 422 N.Y.S.2d
at 50; see note 316 supra. But see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 69194 (1978) (municipal liability may not be imposed vicariously under § 1983); Note, Governmental Liability Under Section 1983 and the FourteenthAmendment After Monell, 53 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 66, 92 n.127 (1978).
Although it appears that punitive damages have not yet been awarded directly against a
municipality in New York, several cases have stated that to do so would be proper if the
facts were such that recklessness or intentional wrongdoing by the municipality were shown.
Kieninger v. City of New York, 53 App. Div. 2d 602, 602-03, 384 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (2d Dep't
1976); Hayes v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 498, 505, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986, 994 (Ct. Cl.), rev'd on other
grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dep't 1975), af'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1044, 360
N.E.2d 959, 392 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1976).
331 48 N.Y.2d at 222, 397 N.E.2d at 740, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 50. The Court opined that the
pernicious effect of personal, noninsurable liability for punitive damages on the lawful performance of municipal functions would be minimal since criminal sanctions and provisions
for attorney's fees presently are utilized in section 1983 actions without a "chilling effect."
Id. at 223, 397 N.E.2d at 740, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976)). See also Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 61 App. Div. 2d 491,
494, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1st Dep't 1978) (punitive damages awarded against media defendant despite claim that award would "chill" first amendment rights); The Survey, 52 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 620, 670-72 (1978).
31148 N.Y.2d at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
333Id. at 229, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54; see Padavan v. Clemente, 43 App.
Div. 2d 729, 730, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (2d Dep't 1973); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59
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islature ultimately may decide to sanction insurance coverage for
punitive damages in either the private or governmental spheres.33
The Village of Hem'pstead decision reflects the Court's view
that the viability of punitive damages both as punishment of the
wrongdoer and as an example to others depends upon their payment directly by the wrongdoer. 5 Provided that punitive damage
awards are proportioned to a defendant's net worth, it is submitted
that preventing him from shifting the burden of paying punitive
damages through the purchase of liability insurance is not unduly
harsh.33 6 Moreover, while indemnification for compensatory damages often is necessary to make the victim whole, similar indemnification for punitive damages, which are awarded over and above
those necessary to compensate the victim, are not.337 It is submitted that for identical reasons, a municipality's statutory obligation
to indemnify its employees for "negligent acts or torts" should not
extend to punitive damage awards. 33 8 A contrary rule would seem
Misc. 2d 615, 618, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-79 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
33' 48 N.Y.2d at 229, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
...Id. at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54; see note 317 supra.
336 See Rupert v. Sellers, 48 App. Div. 2d 265, 272, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (4th Dep't
1975); 21 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 198, 201-02 (1947). In Rupert, discovery of the defendant's
wealth or poverty was permitted for the limited purpose of determining the amount of the
award after the plaintiff had received a special verdict awarding punitive damages. The
court stated that deterrence and punishment of a particular defendant are better accomplished by proportioning the size of the punitive damage award to a party's net worth. 48
App. Div. 2d at 271-72, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
337 Spreading liability for the payment of compensatory damages is justified by the importance of making the victim whole. See Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 204, 224
A.2d 793, 799-800 (1966); note 317 supra. Since the victim already has been fully compensated, liability insurance for punitive damages is less justifiable. See Padavan v. Clemente,
43 App. Div. 2d 729, 730, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (2d Dep't 1973); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins.
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 618, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-79 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969). But see
Zuger, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REV. 239, 257-58 (1976).
338 Although insurance coverage for punitive damages in a section 1983 suit has been
precluded on policy grounds, the General Municipal Law nevertheless obligates a municipality to idemnify an employee for "negligent acts or torts." GML § 50-j(1) (1977). Municipal
statutory arrangements to indemnify employees are rationalized as necessary to shield them
from the threat of civil liability which could inhibit the zealous performance of their duties.
See Corning v Village of Laurel Hollow, 48 N.Y.2d 348, 359-60, 398 N.E.2d 537, 544, 422
N.Y.S.2d 932, 939 (1979) (Meyer, J., dissenting in part); Memorandum of Assemblyman
Nicolosi, reprintedin [1979] N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 402 (GML § 50-k); Memoranda of the City of
New York, reprinted in [1976] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 162-63 (GML §50-j); Sikora, Public Oficers' Personal Liability for Money Damages, 62 MAss. L.Q. 31, 31 n.1 (1977). It should be
noted that a municipality's obligation to indemnify its police officers does not include a
further obligation to defend the employee, absent specific legislation to that effect. See N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); GML § 50-k(2) (Supp. 1979-1980).
Consequently, a municipal employee must pay his own attorney's fees and legal expenses
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to conflict with the Village of Hempstead Court's position that the
efficacy of an award of punitive damages depends upon payment
by the tortfeasor. 339 Moreover, it is suggested that the reasoning of
the Village of Hempstead decision should be extended to invalidate all contracts or agreements that shift liability for punitive
even though the alleged tort was committed within the scope of employment. See Corning v.
Village of Laurel Hollow, 48 N.Y.2d 348, 353, 398 N.E,2d 537, 540, 422 N.Y.S.2d 932, 939
(1979); Report of the Law Revision Commission to the Governor, Relating to the Indemnification and Defense of Public Officers and Employees [1978] LAW REV. COMM'N RzP., reprinted in [1978] N.Y. Laws 1605 (McKinney). The Corning Court acknowledged that a
different rule might obtain where the employee has a lesser degree of discretionary authority. 48 N.Y.2d at 352-53, 398 N.E.2d at 539-40, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 934-35.
In interpreting municipal obligations to indemnify employees, the phrase "within the
scope of employment" has been interpreted so as to shift liability to the municipality in all
but extraordinary cases. See, e.g., Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 41 App.
Div. 2d 869, 869, 342 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (3d Dep't 1973), af'd, 34 N.Y.2d 778, 315 N.E.2d
813, 358 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1974); Fitzgerald v. Lyons, 39 App. Div. 2d 473, 475-76, 336 N.Y.S.2d
940, 943 (4th Dep't 1972); Swerdzewski v. Westhampton Beach, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 695,
291 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 760, 247 N.E.2d 855, 300 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1969). Thus, municipal liability is not precluded even where the employee's act is intentional. See Flamer v. Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114, 118-19, 127 N.E.2d 838, 840 (1955); Baynes v.
New York, 23 App. Div. 2d 756, 756, 258 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (2d Dep't 1965); Hinton v. New
York, 13 App. Div. 2d 475, 475, 212 N.Y.S.2d 97, 97 (1st Dep't 1961). But see N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW § 17(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); GML § 50-k(3) (Supp. 1979-1980).
Should municipal indemnification for punitive damages be required, it would appear
that the obligation to pay such an award will fall directly upon the municipality. Unlike §§
50-b, 50-c and 50-d of the General Municipal Law, § 50-j(1) which applies to police officers
does not limit a municipality's obligation to indemnify an employee to damages arising from
negligence alone. Rather, the legislative definition of a municipality's obligation to indemnify includes responsibility for "negligent acts or torts" of the employee. While the courts
have not yet determined whether indemnification for punitive damages is required by this
section, it is submitted that the provision reflects nothing more than the legislature's cognizance that liability for certain intentional torts such as false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and assault frequently arise from police conduct. See Memoranda of the
City of New York, reprinted in [1976] N.Y. LEGis. ANN. 162-63; 1977 Op. N.Y. ATr'y GEN.
127, 129-30 (municipality's obligation to indemnify certain employees not identical to its
option to procure liability insurance for all employees). No intention to "save harmless" a
police officer for intentional or reckless conduct giving rise to punitive damage liability can
be gleaned from the legislature's approval of indemnification for non-negligent torts. Cf. Le
Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 61 App. Div. 2d 491, 495, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815,
817 (1st Dep't 1978) (intentional tort alone cannot form basis of punitive damage award
absent showing of wrongful motive, or intentional or reckless misdoing). But see Eifert v.
Bush, 27 App. Div. 2d 950, 951, 279 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (2d Dep't 1967), afl'd mem., 22
N.Y.2d 681 (1968) (punitive, as well as compensatory, damages may be proper under a municipal obligation to indemnify police officers pursuant to GML § 50-c).
3:1 48 N.Y.2d at 228, 397 N.E.2d at 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 54. The ultimate result of
requiring municipal indemnification for the uninsurable liability of a punitive damage award
is that innocent taxpayers will be forced to pay penalities assessed against municipal employees while the latter avoid the financial punishment which the court and jury intended
them to suffer personally.
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damages to a third party, irrespective of whether the third party
indemnifier is an insurance carrier, a private employer, or a gov3 40
ernmental unit.
The possibility that the municipal fisc may be depleted by obligation to indemnify for punitive damage awards may prompt the
legislature explicitly to exclude punitive damage liability from the
obligation to indemnify 4 ' or, conversely, to authorize insurance
coverage for this potential liability.3 42 It is submitted that the better course would be to exclude punitive damage liability from the
obligation to indemnify employees for acts committed in the
course of employment, rather than to authorize insurance coverage
"for this purpose. 3 This approach would promote a municipality's
340 In addition to the purchase of a liability policy, obligations to indemnify may be
incurred by contract, see VAUGHAN & ELLIOrr, supra note 315, at 433-34, 516, or by operation of law. See, e.g., GML §§ 50-a to 50-d, 50-j, 50-k (1977 & Supp. 1979-1980); GOL § 3112 (1978) & Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1979-1980). In both situations, liability for punitive damages may be assumed by a third
party and spread among innocent taxpayers or consumers.
341 Recognition of a need to protect municipal coffers may in the future give rise to a
per se ban on assessment of punitive damages against municipalities. New York State and
New York City recently have assumed the obligation to defend employees for the consequences of acts executed within the scope of employment but have expressly disclaimed
liability for punitive damages resulting from intentional wrongdoing or recklessness by the
employee. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 17 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); GML § 50-k (Supp. 19791980). In light of Village of Hempstead, similar legislation soon may be forthcoming to limit
the possibily uninsurable liability of municipalities covered by GML § 50-j(1) (McKinney
1977 & Supp. 1979-1980). Cf. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, U.S., 99 S. Ct.
2121 (1979) (punitive damages may not be awarded in suit for breach of duty of fair representation due to possible impairment of union's financial stability). But see Williams v.
Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460, 548 P.2d 1125, 1132 (1967) (en banc);
City Council of Elizabeth v. Fumero, 143 N.J. Super. 275, 283, 362 A.2d 1279, 1283 (1976). It
is conceivable that the same possibility of financial instability is underscored by statutory
authorization for the purchase of liability insurance by municipalities.
342 Generally, absent a clear indication that coverage is intended, mandatory insurance
legislation should be understood to require full coverage only for compensatory damages.
See Taska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co, 59 Misc. 2d 615, 618, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-79 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1969). But see Hayes v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 498, 505, 363 N.Y.S.2d 986, 994
(Ct. Cl.), rev'd on other grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 693, 376 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dep't 1975),
aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1044, 360 N.E.2d 959, 392 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1976) (absent express exclusion of
liability for punitive damages from Court of Claims Act. Such liability is assumed in state's
waiver of immunity).
313Insurance for punitive damages improperly permits a tortfeasor to limit civil liability for socially reprehensible conduct to the size of his premium. See Northwestern Nat'l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1962). Although a tortfeasor may expose
himself to criminal liability and risk an escalation in premiums, Zuger, Insurance Coverage
of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REV. 239, 253 (1976), innocent policyholders ultimately will
bear the financial impact of the punitive damage award. W. PROSSER, supra note 315, at 13.
Whether municipal liability for punitive damages is direct or vicarious, it similarly is
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interest in protecting its treasury as well as society's interest in
discouraging wanton and reckless conduct by governmental employees."'
Rose Frances DiMartino

Release agreement held no bar to negligence action under rule of
strict construction
It has long been the rule in New York that exculpatory agreements345 intended to insulate one of the contracting parties from
liability for his own ordinary negligence are enforceable 3 4 absent
statutory prohibition 34 7 or overriding public policy.348 Because they
undesirable to permit liability shifting through insurance despite possible adverse consequences to the municipal fisc. Where liability is vicarious, a municipality should be held
responsible for failing to carefully select and train its employees, rather than shifting the
burden to taxpayers. See McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal,
27 DE PAUL L. REv. 571, 577-78 (1978). Where punitive damages are levied directly against a
municipality, society's interest in punishing and deterring antisocial conduct should take
precedence over a threat to a city's financial stability. While the innocent citizenry ultimately will provide the funds from which the award is paid under these approaches, the
dual aims of punishment and deterrence nevertheless are effected because of the citizens'
power to remove those officials whose policies gave rise to the award.
See note 340 supra.
3" The term "exculpatory agreement" has been used indiscriminately by the courts to
encompass both releases and covenants not to sue. Colton v. New York Hosp., 98 Misc. 2d
957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979). Technically, however, a "release" is the
present abandonment of an existing right or claim, while a "covenant not to sue" is a prospective promise to forego a right of action that may accrue in the future. Id. at 963, 414
N.Y.S.2d at 871-72. Since a prospective disclaimer, other than one between joint tortfeasors,
operates as a complete and permanent bar to a cause of action, it has the same legal effect
as a release. Id. at 965, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 873. For purposes of this Survey, the technical
differences between these terms will be regarded as immaterial.
" Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d
693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963); Phibbs v. Ray's Chevrolet Corp., 45 App. Div. 2d 897, 357
N.Y.S.2d 211 (3d Dep't 1974); e.g., Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177
N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1961); Church v. Seneca County Agricultural Soc'y, 41 App.
Div. 2d 787, 341 N.Y.S.2d 45 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 571, 310 N.E.2d 541, 354 N.Y.S.2d
945 (1973); Solodar v. Watkins Glen Grand Prix Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 552, 317 N.Y.S.2d
228 (3d Dep't 1971). See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1932); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971); 15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1750 (3d ed. 1972).
M Agreements purporting to exempt parties engaged in certain businesses serving the
public from liability for their own negligence have been rendered "void as against public
policy and wholly unenforceable" by statutory directive. See GOL § 5-321 (landlords); id. §
5-322 (caterers); id. § 5-323 (building service and maintenance contractors); id. § 5-325 (garages and parking facilities); id. § 5-326 (places of public amusement and recreation).
3' Releases purporting to exculpate parties from liability for injuries caused by gross
negligence or intentional wrongs, however, are absolutely void as against public policy. See,

